Disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan
In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The initial phase of the war, a combination of U.S. airstrikes and ground support for the Northern Alliance, swiftly toppled the Taliban regime that had harbored Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
Following this initial success, the U.S. and its NATO allies embarked on a nearly two-decade-long mission focused on nation-building, counter-terrorism, and training the Afghan security forces. This extended campaign continued through the terms of four U.S. presidents—two Republicans and two Democrats. Over the course of the conflict, approximately 2,460 U.S. service members were killed, and over 20,000 were wounded. Troop levels fluctuated significantly, peaking at around 100,000 in 2011. Despite this long-term presence and massive investment, the Taliban remained a persistent and resilient insurgency.
In February 2020, the Trump administration signed a conditional peace agreement with the Taliban—a deal that notably excluded the Afghan government—paving the way for a U.S. withdrawal. While this agreement was set by the Trump administration, the final withdrawal was executed by the Biden administration, which proceeded with the full pullout in the summer of 2021. The departure was marked by a chaotic and rapid collapse of the Afghan government and military. The Taliban swiftly recaptured the entire country, culminating in the fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021.
In the wake of the Afghan government's collapse, a significant amount of U.S-funded military equipment provided to the Afghan National Security Forces was abandoned. According to the Department of Defense, this included over $7 billion worth of hardware, such as aircraft, tactical vehicles, weapons, and advanced communication gear. The final U.S. military withdrawal on August 30, 2021, ended America's longest war, leaving the Taliban in control of the country and in possession of a vast arsenal.
In the final analysis, a strong argument can be made that the strategic error was escalating the war beyond its initial objectives. From this perspective, the mission should have probably shifted after the defeat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in late 2001. While these groups would have undoubtedly regrouped, a small contingent of U.S. Special Forces could have remained in-country, working with indigenous forces on a long-term counter-terrorism mission. This approach would have avoided the futile "nation-building" effort, a lesson detailed in books like In the Graveyard of Empires by Seth G. Jones, which points to the historical failure of foreign powers to impose their will on Afghanistan.
